The Saudi Deal the U.S. Actually Needs
6 min read
A long-rumored deal to form a strategic partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia looks doomed to fail because of Israel’s inability to accept a path toward Palestinian statehood in exchange for normalized ties with Saudi Arabia.
As the deal collapses, though, it is worth asking: What kind of relationship should the United States and Saudi Arabia aspire to? What is reasonable for each side to ask of the other?
On a recent trip to the kingdom, I spent a week speaking with Saudis from various backgrounds: wealthy businessmen from the eastern province, young Saudi women starting out in careers unimaginable to their mothers, senior government officials responsible for topics including privatization and foreign policy, and young Saudi men doing everything from starting their own law firm to driving for Uber after their government job had ended for the day.
Beyond their usual warm hospitality, and their patience with my rusty Arabic, I was struck by two things in conversations with Saudis: First, it is hard not get caught up in the infectious confidence they have about the direction their country is headed in. They feel like they are building something new—and judging by the innumerable construction cranes on Riyadh’s skyline, they are.
Second, there is deep frustration and even disillusionment with the United States. As a former government official, I am used to the regular complaints, such as the tiresome allegations that the United States is “abandoning” the region (despite the tens of thousands of troops that continue to garrison the Persian Gulf). But I heard newer, more disturbing concerns. At dinner with a dozen or so older Saudi men one night—almost all of whom had a degree from a U.S. university—I heard real reservations about sending their children and grandchildren to the United States to study: Gun violence, societal divisions, and populist politics in America were all cited as reasons to send their children to the United Kingdom or Europe instead. One Saudi who had gotten his Ph.D. in the United States worried that “the America I love is tearing itself apart at the seams.” And for what it’s worth, I heard something very similar from a group of businessmen in Singapore two weeks later.
Yet I also found Saudis eager for a closer partnership with the United States. No country on Earth can match the United States when it comes to our technology, military power, and dynamic economy. (Joe Biden’s campaign would love for American voters to see our economy the way the rest of the world does.)
But is it in America’s interest to forge a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia? As unpopular as the idea may be with many progressives, I think it is. Exciting changes are taking place in Saudi Arabia, and we should want to help advance them. Besides, in the Middle East, you tend to have either countries with a lot of people but not broad wealth, such as Egypt, or countries with a lot of wealth but few people, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia is the only country in the region that has both, which is what makes it such an attractive market for American firms. And it’s also what makes Saudi Arabia so tantalizing as a strategic partner: If Saudi Arabia could ever get its act together militarily, for example, it could be a valuable partner for the United States in the region and abroad.
The Saudis have a long list of things they want from the United States. They want investing here to be easier, for example. They complain about the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which scrutinizes foreign investment in sensitive technologies or crucial infrastructure. The process is necessary, but it could arrive at decisions faster, something Democratic administrations in particular have trouble making it do. And the Saudis also rightly complain that investments with no obvious national-security angle are heavily scrutinized. I spoke with many Saudis, from the most senior princes to ordinary businessmen, who took offense that the Saudi investment in golf of all things had become the subject of a Senate investigation. And really, who can blame them? Calm down, senators, it’s golf.
The Saudis also want access to more sensitive U.S. technologies, and there is a deal to be done here. The U.S. government paved the way for a substantial Microsoft investment in the UAE’s G42, a large AI firm, on the condition that the UAE would divest from problematic technological partnerships and investments in China. You “have to make a choice” between the United States and China, G42’s CEO, Peng Xiao, lamented. The United States and Saudi Arabia can and should strike a similar deal.
Security is a trickier matter, and here the United States should demand as much as it offers. The Saudis want a Japan-like security guarantee from the United States, but the United States should not offer this until the Saudis can meaningfully contribute to a military coalition.
The good news for both the United States and Saudi Arabia is that some of the reforms initiated by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—and not ones aimed at the military, interestingly—could allow the Saudis to develop military capabilities that have heretofore escaped them.
There is no reason, for example, that Saudi Arabia—a nation whose entire economy depends on the ability to move oil and gas over sea lanes—has no real navy to speak of. But training a navy is hard when sailors cannot be away from their families for more than a day or so at a time. Successful navies live at sea, and that’s not an option when the wives men leave at home cannot drive themselves to the grocery store or their children to school. That’s now changing, and it could be that we someday trace the development of Saudi Arabia’s independent naval capabilities back to its decision to grant greater independence to its women.
Saudi Arabia’s ground forces are likewise woeful. Developing competent ground forces involves deeply unsexy work—as far from a bright, shiny fighter jet sitting on a runway as possible. Infantry units must be physically fit and well drilled. I have yet to see a Saudi unit that is either. But it’s clear to me that young Saudi men and women are up for a challenge, and the Saudis should do as some of their neighbors have done: Build best-in-class special-operations forces from recruits who genuinely want to be part of such units and are willing to put in the hard work and pain required. Competent Saudi special-operations units that could function as true peers alongside U.S. units would do a lot to change the perception of Saudis among their counterparts in the U.S. military.
Once Saudis have proved their ability to work alongside the U.S. military—and their ability to share the burden of clearing and defending the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb waterways—the United States should consider extending security guarantees. But not before.
Even if the United States and Saudi Arabia fail to conclude an agreement during the Biden administration, however, I am still bullish about the future of relations between the two countries. I speak to U.S. companies on an almost-weekly basis that are interested in investing in Saudi Arabia or partnering with Saudi companies. And despite reservations about the direction in which America is headed—many of which I share, as an American—the Saudis can’t take their eyes off us. I noted on my trip that many Saudis excitedly asked me about the pro-Palestinian protests taking place on our college campuses. They devour our films and media and political news, all of which are much more accessible than the same from, say, China.
The United States and Saudi Arabia seem fated to deepen their partnership. We should make that partnership as functional as possible.
